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Elias: Nearly Toothless: Why the Speech Act is Mostly Bark, with Little

NOTE
NEARLY TOOTHLESS:
WHY THE SPEECH ACT
IS MOSTLY BARK, WITH LITTLE BITE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, after his first appearance as the title character in The
Tenninator,' and before his stint as the thirty-eighth Governor of
California,2 Arnold Schwarzenegger found himself trying to squelch a
public relations nightmare.3 Two years earlier, celebrity journalist
Wendy Leigh supplied information to a writer of a front-page story in
Rupert Murdoch's News of the World, which claimed that
Schwarzenegger was a Hitler admirer who held "fervent Nazi and antiSemitic views."4 By 1990, Leigh was on the verge of publishing an
unauthorized biography filled with allegations of Schwarzenegger's past
homosexual experiences, use and sale of steroids, and criminal history. 5
Leigh claimed that Schwarzenegger waged a campaign to halt the
publication and sabotage the promotion of her book.6 Schwarzenegger's
publicist allegedly offered money to Leigh's publisher to drop the
biography and threatened television producers who wanted to feature
1. THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film 1984). The film marked Arnold Schwarzenegger's first
of three appearances as the Terminator in a franchise created by director James Cameron. See James
Cameron, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nmnO001 16/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
2. Arnold Schwarzenegger, STATE OF CAL., http://govemors.library.ca.gov/38-Schwarzen
egger.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (stating that Governor Schwarzenegger took office in 2003).
3. See generally Neal Koch, The Hollywood Treatment: The Terminator at Work?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 25, 28-29 (reporting on claims of Schwarzenegger's "heavyhanded campaign" to suppress the publication of Wendy Leigh's book, which contained damaging
information about Schwarzenegger).
4. LAURENCE LEAMER, FANTASTIC: THE LIFE OF ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER 193-94
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The article alleged that Schwarzenegger's father "had
personally directed the rounding up of Jews to be taken to concentration camps." Id. Although Leigh
was given a joint byline on the story, she did not take part in writing it. Id. at 194.
5. Charles Fleming, Arnie's Army, SPY, Mar. 1992, at 60, 63. Time correspondent James
Willwerth verified Leigh's research, claiming that the biography "was very well reported." Koch,
supranote 3, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Koch, supra note 3, at 28.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:235

Leigh on their shows.7 Nonetheless, attempts to suppress the
dissemination of Leigh's work failed-that is, until Schwarzenegger
sued Leigh and News of the World for libel.8 When Schwarzenegger
pursued the libel lawsuit in the United Kingdom, he became one of the
world's first "libel tourists"9-a well-heeled public figure, scorned by a
scandalous publication and seeking redress in a court outside the United
States with plaintiff-friendly libel laws. 10
Because U.K. libel law required News of the World to prove not
only that it believed what it had published, but also that what it had
published was actually the truth and important for the public to know,
the paper settled with Schwarzenegger for £30,000." Leigh, who
initially claimed that the lawsuit was harassment, settled out of court in
1993 after her Schwarzenegger biography suffered disappointing sales.12
She paid Schwarzenegger substantial damages and legal fees and
publicly apologized for the News of the World article, stating that there
was "not a word of truth" in it. 13 When later commenting on the Leigh
debacle, Schwarzenegger allegedly said: "Everybody in [the United
States] has the freedom to say what he or she wants to, 1but
I sometimes
4
think there is too much of that commodity for my taste."'
Since 1990, libel tourism-the practice of forum shopping in nonU.S. courts whose defamation laws do not afford First Amendment-type
protections to authors and publishers-has grown in popularity. 15 From

7. Id. at 28-29.
8. LEAMER, supra note 4, at 194.
9. See Mark Stephens, Partner, Finers Stephens Innocent, Remarks at the Authors Guild
Foundation Panel Discussion: Rules, Britannia! The Growing, Chilling Reach of Commonwealth
Libel Laws (Sept. 25, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.authorsguild.org/publications/
seminartranscripts/rules.html) (stating that Arnold Schwarzenegger "was the first libel tourist to
climb aboard the Concorde and come over to London in three and a half hours in order to skip up
the Strand with a writ in his hand merrily to issue it against an American authoress named Wendy
Leigh").
10. Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel Tourist's Defamation Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 467, 468 (2010) (defining a "libel tourist" as a forum shopper who shuns the United States
in order to file "a defamation lawsuit against a U.S. defendant in a forum with plaintiff-favoring
defamation doctrines").
11. LEAMER, supra note 4, at 194-95; Koch, supra note 3, at 29. The British paper also issued
a public apology, stating that "there was no truth to any of the allegations." LEAMER, supra note 4,
at 195.
12. LEAMER, supra note 4, at 195-96; Koch, supra note 3, at 29.
13. LEAMER, supra note 4, at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Fleming, supra note 5, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 l1th Cong. 49 (2009) [hereinafter Libel Tourism Hearing] (prepared
statement of Laura R. Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP). The topic of libel tourism is
so popular that it has even made primetime television. In an episode of The Good Wife, an American
legal drama airing on CBS, Alicia Florrick (played by Julianna Margulies) successfully defends her
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U.S. celebrities such as Britney Spears and Harrison Ford to "ex-Soviet
oligarchs and Middle Eastern oil tycoons,"'16 wealthy litigants have used
libel tourism against American authors and publishers (including those
online) for various purposes: to obtain public apologies, retractions,
settlements, or default judgments, or simply to intimidate and dissuade
future publication about them. 17 As a result, libel tourism has had the
dangerous result of depriving U.S. citizens of their First Amendment
rights.' 8 The practice has not only made celebrity tabloids think twice
regarding whom they write about and what they publish about
celebrities, 1 9 but it has also deterred reporting on matters of serious
public importance.2 ° In effect, libel tourism has taken a toll on the ability
of scholars and j ournalists to publish their work.2
On August 10, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional
Heritage Act (the "SPEECH Act"), 22 with hopes that the Act would put
an end to libel tourism. 23 The SPEECH Act bars U.S. domestic courts
from enforcing or recognizing foreign libel judgments, unless a court
finds that the foreign judgment comports with the First Amendment.24
client in the United States against a charge of libel, but must argue the case again via video
conference when the suit is brought before a London court. The Good Wife: The Death Zone (CBS
television broadcast Oct. 2, 2011). "Do you know the key distinction between the libel laws in your
country and mine?" asks Eddie Izzard as opposing British counsel. Id."The burden of proof is
reversed." Id.
16. See Ellen Bernstein, Comment, Libel Tourism's Final Boarding Call, 20 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 205, 206-07, 212-13 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing celebrities
such as Jennifer Lopez, Marc Anthony, Cameron Diaz, Kate Hudson, Britney Spears, and Harrison
Ford as plaintiffs who have sued for libel abroad; also listing Russian media tycoon Boris
Berezovsky and Saudi businessman Khalid bin Mahfouz as libel tourists).
17. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep. Peter King)
(listing the multiple intentions litigants have in using libel tourism).
18. See U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 93d Sess., July 7-25, 2008, 81, U.N. Doc.
A/63/40 (Vol. I);GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2008), available at http://www.ccprcentre.
org/doc/ICCPR/AR/A_63_40(Vol%201)_Eng.pdf (criticizing the United Kingdom's libel laws as
having a chilling effect upon freedom of expression).
19. See Robert Verkaik, Invasion of the Libel Tourists, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/invasion-of-the-libel-tourists-904
11 L.html.
20. U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., supranote 18, 81.
21. Id.
22. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (Supp. IV 2011)).
23. S. REP. No. 111-224, at 8 (2010) ("The SPEECH Act... will prevent the chilling of
American free speech that is the inevitable result of these foreign libel lawsuits."); PresidentObama
to Sign SPEECH Act Today, STEVE COHEN FOR CONG. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.cohen
forcongress.com/2010/08/10/president-obama-to-sign-speech-act-today (reporting that President
Obama would sign into law the SPEECH Act, a law that "puts an end to libel tourism," on August
10, 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(l)(A). The SPEECH Act bars a U.S. domestic court from recognizing
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The Act also allows authors to seek a declaration that the foreign libel
judgment is "repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States,"
in order to combat the negative financial and professional repercussions
the foreign libel judgment may have on their work.
As much as the SPEECH Act might at first appear to afford
American authors and publishers protection from foreign libel laws, it is
likely that the Act will not end libel tourism and will have few
discernible effects combating the practice.26 In its current form, the
SPEECH Act is inadequate to restrict a litigant's ability to file libel suits
overseas, win default judgments, gain publicity, and continue to
intimidate American authors. 27 Without broader measures such as the
ability to recover legal fees incurred abroad, the SPEECH Act is
essentially without teeth in deterring those who contemplate suing
American authors in the United Kingdom-a popular forum for libel
tourism-or other foreign jurisdictions. 28 Not only does the SPEECH
Act lack the means to actively combat the practice of libel tourism, but
the Act also may create serious implications for international comity.29 A
decision by a U.S. court, pursuant to the SPEECH Act, not to enforce a
foreign libel judgment could affect a foreign country's willingness to
enforce U.S. libel judgments, or judgments based on U.S. laws that are
plaintiff-friendly.30
or enforcing a foreign libel judgment unless the court determines that "the defamation law applied in
the foreign court's adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and
press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States" and by the laws of the state in which the court is located. Id. Nevertheless, even if the
defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication did not comport with the First
Amendment, recognition or enforcement is permitted if the foreign-judgment creditor proves that
the defendant in the foreign action would have been found liable for defamation under the U.S.
Constitution and state law. Id. § 4102(a)(l)(B).
25. See id § 4104(a)(1).
26. Mark A. Fischer & Franklin Levy, The SPEECH Act: Speaking Softly?, FIRST AMEND.
CENTER (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentjournal.org/commentary.aspx?id=23483
("Progressive at first glance, the SPEECH Act may... have few discernible effects.").
27. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep. Peter King).
Representative King believed that the failed H.R. 6146, a bill similar to the SPEECH Act, did not go
far enough to combat the threat of libel tourism. See id. He claimed that "[floreign litigants [would]
still be allowed to file... libel suits overseas with no worry of being countersued here in the U.S."
Id.
28. See id.at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American Center for Democracy); David B.
Rivkin, Jr. & Bruce D. Brown, Op-Ed., 'Libel Tourism' Threatens Free Speech, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10-11, 2009, at Al 1. Rachel Ehrenfeld stated that provisions for damages and the ability to
countersue "are essential to remove the chilling effect of foreign libel suits." Libel Tourism Hearing,
supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American Center for Democracy).
29.

EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41417, THE SPEECH ACT: THE FEDERAL

RESPONSE TO "LIBEL TOURISM" 14 (2010) (concluding that "[t]he passage of the SPEECH Act may
have implications for international comity").
30. Id. at 13 ("[S]ome countries condition recognition of foreign judgments on the foreign
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The United States should take further legislative steps to ensure that
American authors and publishers are shielded from foreign libel actions
that are not adjudicated under First Amendment standards. However, the
best answer to the libel tourism problem-an issue that threatens
journalism and publishing not only in the United States, but around the
globe-is a transnational solution.3 1 International agreements that would
harmonize laws relating to the exercise of jurisdiction over defamation
cases may be the most effective means to solve the problem of libel
32
tourism.
Part II of this Note will compare American and British libel law, as
well as certain aspects of the countries' civil procedure rules and
practices. This comparison will demonstrate why libel tourism, and why
bringing libel actions in the United Kingdom in particular, has become
such a popular practice. Part II also will illustrate examples of libel
tourism's chilling effect on coverage of business, history, politics, and
national security news. Furthermore, Part II will explain the failed
federal attempts to solve the problem of libel tourism, and how Congress
purports to deter libel tourism's effect on American journalism and
publishing under the SPEECH Act. Part III of this Note will identify the
legal issues the SPEECH Act has raised. It will demonstrate that the
SPEECH Act, in its current form, is a weak response to libel tourism,
and may have negative repercussions on international comity. Finally,
Part IV will propose two routes that can and should be taken to address
the problem of libel tourism. First, Congress can modify the SPEECH
Act to give it sharper teeth. Second, the United States can take steps to
form agreements with the United Kingdom-and other sovereigns where
libel tourism is a common practice-that would harmonize international
jurisdiction law over defamation cases. The latter solution, involving
foreign sovereigns like the United Kingdom, is the optimal solution,
considering that libel tourism is an issue faced by authors and publishers
not only in the United States but also around the world.

country's reciprocal recognition of judgments of the same type. In such countries,
refusal to enforce libel judgments would likely serve as a ground for refusing to
judgments rendered by state or federal courts in the United States.").
31. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 71 (prepared statement
Silberman, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law).
32. Sayuj Banerjee, Libel Tourism: Solving the Problem of Globetrotting

U.S. courts'
enforce libel
of Linda J.
Defamation

Plaintiffs-with Legislation, Treaties, and Legal Outsourcing, LAW WiTHouT BORDERS (Sept. 20,

2010),
http://lawwithoutborders.typepad.com/legaloutsourcing/201 0/09Aibel-tourism-solving-theproblem-of-globetrotting-defamation-plaintiffs-with-legislation-treaties-a.html.
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WHY LIBEL PLAINTIFFS SUE ABROAD

Simply put, the purpose of libel law in the United States and the
United Kingdom is to provide redress against false communications that
harm a plaintiffs reputation.' 3 Beyond that general purpose, however,
the similarities end, and the glaring differences between U.S. and U.K.
libel law begin. In fact, libel laws in these countries nearly "constitute
mirror images of each other.",34 The most glaring difference lies in the
burden of proof: In a U.S. libel action, that burden is on the plaintiff,
is shifted to the defendant in a libel action within the
whereas the burden
35
United Kingdom.
This and other differences in the countries' laws generate an
incentive for libel plaintiffs to sue authors and publishers in the United
Kingdom.36 Although many U.S. principles of law derive from the
English common law, a significant distinction between the countries'
treatment of defamation suits lies in the United Kingdom's lack of an
equivalent to the First Amendment.3 7 This amendment, which is so
entrenched in the U.S. legal system, prohibits Congress from creating
any law that "abridg[es] the freedom of speech, or of the press. ' 38 It is
the First Amendment that is at the heart of the legal dissimilarities giving
rise to libel tourism.39
Although the U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to use the First
Amendment as a means of protecting the media from libel lawsuits, the
seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan40 changed that. 4' The

33. See Avi BELL, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, LIBEL TOURISM: INTERNATIONAL
FORUM SHOPPING FOR DEFAMATION CLAIMS 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.globallawforum.
org/UserFiles/puzzle22New(1).pdf.

34. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 46 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman,
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP).

35. Id.
36. See infra Part ILA-C.

37. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating
that while "[ilt is true that England and the United States share many common law principles of

law... a significant difference between the two jurisdictions lies in England's lack of an equivalent
to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution").
38.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

39. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Steven Pressman, An Unfettered Press: Libel Law in the United States, INFOUSA,
http://usinfo.org/enus/governmentloverview/libellaw.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). See Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 256 ("We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel
action...."). Respondent Sullivan was a commissioner who supervised the police department of
Montgomery, Alabama. Id. He sued the New York Times Company for running an advertisement
about brutal police conduct against Black students. Id. at 256-57. Although the advertisement, which
contained several inaccurate statements, did not refer to Sullivan by name, Sullivan argued that the
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1964 case noted the United States's "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. 42 To create an environment where debate on issues and
matters of public concern could thrive, the Sullivan Court applied a
constitutional restraint on defamation actions 3 Consequently, even
though "hundreds of libel lawsuits are filed against newspapers,
magazines, and radio and television stations in the United States" every
year, few plaintiffs prevail over a media defendant's First Amendment
rights. 44
While defamation law in the United States has diverged sharply
from its pro-plaintiff roots, the United Kingdom continues to be
recognized as a country with substandard protection of authors and
publishers.4 5 The incentive for libel plaintiffs to sue in the United
Kingdom is enhanced by the even more worrisome differences between
American civil procedure and those rules in the United Kingdom. 46 For
example, the United Kingdom is willing to exercise jurisdiction over a
libel suit brought by a non-U.K. citizen concerning a foreign publication,
so long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that the publication has had even
the slightest exposure to the public within the country, and that the
plaintiff's reputation was harmed there.4 7 The combination of the
countries' disparities in libel law, and in procedure and jurisdiction law,
creates a so-called "perfect storm" in which the practice of libel forum
shopping can flourish. 4
ad could be read as referring to him. Id. at 258. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000. Id. at 256. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment, holding that the newspaper's
statements were libelous per se. Id. at 263. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed; it held
that state rules allowing public officials to recover damages for false statements made concerning
their official conduct were unconstitutional-that is, unless those officials could prove the
statements were made with actual malice. Id. at 264, 283.
42. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
43. See Sarah Staveley-O'Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and
Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 252, 256 (2009) (stating that the Sullivan
Court's intent was "to give the press the 'breathing space' necessary to report on issues affecting the
public without having to censor itself for fear of making a mistake").
44. Pressman, supra note 41.
45. BELL, supra note 33, at 15.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. BELL, supra note 33, at 15-16. See Douglas Lee, 2 International Libel Cases Could
Benefit U.S. Publishers, FIRST AMEND. CENTER (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.firstamendment
center.org/2-intemational-libel-cases-could-benefit-u-s-publishers (noting that, in the case where
Khalid bin Mahfouz, a non-U.K. citizen, pursued a libel action against American author Rachel
Ehrenfeld, the United Kingdom was willing to entertain the suit even though only twenty-three
copies of Ehrenfeld's book were purchased over the Internet by U.K. citizens).
48. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 255.
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U.S. Libel Law

An individual who sues an author for libel in the United States must
overcome the author's First Amendment right to free speech in order to
prevail. 49 To do this, U.S. libel law requires a defamation plaintiff to
bear three burdens of proof. The plaintiff must establish the falsity of a
statement, the fault of the defendant (that is, the defendant's culpability),
and the harm that the statement caused.5 ° Under U.S. case law, burdens
of proof vary further, depending on whom the libel plaintiff is and to
what degree the defamatory information is important to the public. 5'
In a U.S. libel action, the falsity of a statement and the defendant's
culpability are not presumed,52 On the contrary, where the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure,53 he or she must first prove that the
defendant's statement was substantially false.54 Then, the plaintiff must
prove with "convincing clarity" that the statement was made with
"'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that [the statement] was false
55
or with reckless disregard of whether [the statement] was false or not.,
Even in cases where the plaintiff is a private figure involved in a matter
of public concern, falsity and fault are not presumed.56 In such cases, the
plaintiff must first prove that the allegedly defamatory statement was

49. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.").
50. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that the plaintiff
must bear the burden of showing falsity and fault); BELL, supra note 33, at 10-11.
51. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 28 exhibit A (prepared statement of Bruce
D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
52. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777 (holding that "the common-law presumption that defamatory
speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of
public concern"); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84 (rejecting the presumption of a defendant's
culpability).
53. The term "public official" can apply "at the very least to those among the hierarchy of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
"Public figures" are those who "assume[] roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society,"
"occupy positions of... persuasive power and influence," or "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). In any
event, those classified as public figures are exposed to close public scrutiny. Id.
54. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). "Minor
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous
charge be justified." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 285-86 (holding that a public official is prohibited from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he can prove
with convincing clarity that the statement was made with actual malice).
56. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 28 exhibit A (prepared statement of Bruce
D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss1/13

8

Elias: Nearly Toothless: Why the Speech Act is Mostly Bark, with Little

20111

WHY THE SPEECHACT IS MOSTLY BARK, WITH LITTLE BITE

substantially false, at least where a media defendant is involved. 57 The
plaintiff must then prove that the defendant (at least) negligently made
the false statement at issue. 58 Although these standards are rather lax in
comparison to those set in cases where the libel plaintiff is a public
official or public figure, these standards nevertheless59 are more protective
against defamation actions than are U.K. libel laws.
B.

60
The Law of Libel in a Town Named Sue

While it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to win a libel suit in the
United States, the United Kingdom is recognized as one of the most
plaintiff-friendly forums for defamation actions. 6 1 This, along with the
United Kingdom's civil procedure and jurisdiction law, creates an
incentive for litigants to bring their libel actions in U.K. courts. 62 In
striking contrast to U.S. libel law, the law of libel in the United Kingdom
treats any statement that negatively affects an individual's reputation as
presumptively defamatory.6 3 Therefore, to make a prima facie case for
defamation, the plaintiff merely has to prove that the statement is about
him or her, has a defamatory meaning, and was indeed published by the
defendant. 64 After a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, defendantswho would have had no burden of proof in a U.S. libel action-must
either prove that the statement they made is true or establish another
defense.6 5
57. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768-69 (holding that where a media defendant "publishes speech
of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without... showing that the
statements at issue are [substantially] false").
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (refusing to extend the actual malice standard set by Sullivan to
defamation of private individuals). See also id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Court now
conditions a libel action by a private person upon a showing of negligence, as contrasted with a
showing of willful or reckless disregard ... .
59. See infra Part Il.B.
60. Bruce D. Brown testified before the former U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law that "[i]t is a favorite line of London libel lawyers when they
travel to conferences in the U.S. to quip with a nod to the great Johnny Cash, that they have just
come from a town named Sue." Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 15 (statement of Bruce D.
Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
61. See Rivkin & Brown, supra note 28, at AI (stating that libel tourists have exploited
British courts and London, libel tourism's "hot destination," in particular). See also Daily Politics:
Comedians Find Englandand Wales Libel Laws Unfunny (BBC television broadcast Mar. 12, 2010)
[hereinafter Daily Politics], available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lj_4ksUWyNI (stating
that "London has become the libel capital of the world").
62. See Daily Politics, supra note 61 (discussing why the United Kingdom's libel laws
unfairly favor the plaintiff).
63. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 46 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman,
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Defenses available in a U.K. libel action spare defendants from
proving the truth of their statements.66 One such defense includes the fair
comment exception, which may apply to opinions made by defendants
on a matter of public interest.67 To satisfy that exception, the opinion
must be one that the author could reasonably express based on true or
privileged facts and must also be made without malice.68 While the fair
comment exception does give defendants a degree of protection when
stating opinions based on true or privileged facts, it affords far less
protection than U.S. libel law, which treats only statements of fact as
actionable. 69 Generally speaking, statements of opinion based on
accurate factual information are not actionable in U.S. courts, regardless
of whether the opinions are reasonably expressed, and even if the author
states his or her opinion with malice.7 °
Libel plaintiffs also have an incentive to sue in the United Kingdom
because of that country's application of the multiple publication rule.7 1
66. See id. Defenses available in a U.K. libel action include the following: justification, which
requires the defendant to establish the substantial truth of the defamatory statements complained of;
absolute privilege, which protects statements made in Parliament and during court proceedings, as
well as the neutral and accurate reports of such statements; and qualified privilege, which protects
certain statements made by defendants when they were not acting with malice and when they had a
moral, social, or legal duty to convey the information to another who had an interest in receiving
that information. Main Roger Scordato, The InternationalLegal Environmentfor Serious Political
Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed: Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of English
Defamation Law, 40 CONN. L. REV. 165, 172-73 (2007). Factors used to determine whether the
qualified privilege applies greatly narrow protection of libel defendants. See id. at 174-75.
67. Scordato, supra note 66, at 172.
68. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 46-47 (prepared statement of Laura R.
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP); Scordato, supra note 66, at 172.
69. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 46-47 (prepared statement of Laura R.
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP).
70. Id. at 47. Although the U.S. Supreme Court refused to create an "artificial dichotomy
between 'opinion' and fact," where only the latter statements are actionable, the Court noted that
"the issue of falsity relates to the defamatory facts implied by a statement." Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 20 n.7 (1990) (emphasis omitted). The Court explained that the
statement, "I think Jones lied," is provable as false in two respects: "First, that the speaker really did
not think Jones had lied but said it anyway, and second that Jones really had not lied. It is ... the
Id.
I at
second level of falsity which would ordinarily serve as the basis for a defamation action ....
20 n.7.
71. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 260-61 (explaining the United Kingdom's
multiple publication rule). The rule also allows the statute of limitations to run anew each time a
"publication" of defamatory material occurs; in contrast, under the United States's single
publication rule, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the first publication. Robert
Balin et al., Libel Tourism and the Duke's Manservant,MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Sept.
2009, at 97, 105. The multiple publication rule derives from the nineteenth century case, Duke of
Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.); 14 Q.B. 185. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra
note 43, at 261 & n.37. An article that allegedly defamed the plaintiff, the Duke of Brunswick, was
published in the Weekly Dispatch in 1830. Duke of Brunswick, 117 Eng. Rep. at 75; 14 Q.B. at 185.
Eighteen years later, after the statute of limitations had run, the Duke's servant bought a back-issue
of the Weekly Dispatch containing the article; another issue was obtained from the British Museum.
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This rule allows every publication of a single work to give rise to a
separate defamation action.72 For example, a plaintiff suing in a U.K.
court for defamation found in a book may be able to bring multiple libel
suits, even though those suits are based on the same defamatory
material.73 In contrast, most U.S. states apply the single publication
rule.74 In the United States, communication of allegedly defamatory
information from books and newspapers to an entire group of people
results in only one action for damages.75
Courts in the United States have almost unanimously applied the
single publication rule to Internet sources as well. 76 In contrast, the
United Kingdom has applied its multiple publication rule to material
found on the Internet.77 This essentially means that every Internet hit on
a webpage containing allegedly defamatory information generates a new
publication upon which a plaintiff can sue an Internet service provider
("ISP") or user for libel in the United Kingdom. 78 Those who discover
libelous information about themselves on the Internet have an even
greater incentive to sue in the United Kingdom because the country has
no law equivalent to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
199679 in the United States.80 The statute provides ISPs and website
operators immunity from liability for defamatory information posted by
users on the Internet, even if the ISPs and website operators were put on
notice of that information.8 1 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, ISPs and

Id. at 76; 14 Q.B. at 187. After the Duke sued for libel, the Queen's Bench held that once the Duke's
servant had bought the back-issue and read the allegedly defamatory material, a new, actionable
"publication" occurred. Id. at 76; 14 Q.B. at 189.
72. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 260-61.
73. See Duke of Brunswick, 117 Eng. Rep. at 76; 14 Q.B. at 188-89.
74. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 260.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977) (stating that "[any one edition of a
book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or
similar aggregate communication is a single publication" and that "[als to any single
publication.., only one action for damages can be maintained").
76. Itai Maytal, Libel Lessons from Across the Pond: What British Courts Can Learnfrom the
United States' Chilling Experience with the "Multiple PublicationRule" in Traditional Media and
the Internet, 3 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 121, 132 & n.64 (2010) (stating that U.S. courts that must
confront the issue of whether to apply the single or multiple publication rule have noted that
applying the single publication rule to the Internet furthers the goals of the rule).
77. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 261.
78. Id. ("To the dismay of journalists worldwide, British courts have continued to apply this
Victorian-era [Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer] case in the modem information age, which has led to
the absurd result that a single Internet hit in the United Kingdom constitutes a 'publication' for libel
purposes.").
79. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 137-39
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)).
80. See Balin et al., supra note 71, at 106.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (protecting providers of interactive computer services from
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website operators are not held liable for the initial dissemination of
defamatory information posted by users-however, once ISPs or website
operators are put on notice of and fail to remove defamatory usergenerated content, they can become liable for the publication of such
content.82
C. U.S. and UK Civil Procedureand Jurisdiction
Not only does the stark contrast between U.S. and U.K. libel law
induce plaintiffs to sue in the United Kingdom, but U.K. civil procedure
and jurisdiction law in general also encourage litigants to bring their
libel actions to U.K. courts. Specifically, the United Kingdom's laws
concerning personal jurisdiction, the financing of litigation, and the level
of review applied during appeals are plaintiff-friendly as compared to the
procedure and jurisdiction law applied by U.S. courts.
1. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction
For a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, due
process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the
forum-that is, have sufficient dealings or affiliations so that the
exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable, and "such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."'' 83 When defamatory content appears on the
Internet, U.S. courts have held that the defendant has minimum contacts
with a forum state if the defendant's Internet activity expressly targets
that forum.84 In contrast, U.K. courts have exercised personal jurisdiction
over defendants that have little connection to the United Kingdom,
simply on the basis that the statements at issue have reached or are
accessible within the United Kingdom, either on- or offline.85 U.K.
courts have been willing to exercise jurisdiction over these defendants,
even if their statements did not target the United Kingdom and even
when the statements have had minimal exposure to the public within that
86

forum.

defamation actions filed due to third-party content posted on their websites); Balin et al., supra note
71, at 106.
82. Balin et al., supra note 71, at 106.
83. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S, 310, 316 (1945) (establishing requirements for a
U.S. court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant).
84. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 261-62.
85. See, e.g., Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156, [22]-[23] (Eng.).
86. See, e.g., id.
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For example, in Berezovsky v. Michaels,87 a U.K. court held that it
could exercise personal jurisdiction over the publisher of Forbes.88 The
court did so, even though less than a quarter of one percent of the
magazine's circulation occurred within the United Kingdom, and
notwithstanding that reputational harm to the plaintiff, a Russian
national, would likely occur in Russia and not the United Kingdom.8 9
Similarly, in Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld,90 only twenty-three copies of the
defendant-author's book were purchased in the United Kingdom (via
online booksellers), and only one chapter of the book was accessible to
U.K. citizens on the Internet. 91 Nonetheless, a U.K. court92 exercised
personal jurisdiction over American writer Rachel Ehrenfeld.
2. Financing Litigation
Under the "American rule" of financing litigation, each party is
responsible for paying its own legal fees. 93 In contrast, courts in the
United Kingdom allow fee shifting, where the losing party must pay
both its own legal fees and the legal fees of the winning party.94 Fee
shifting creates "a significant financial incentive to bring suit in the
United Kingdom, because the losing party bears the costs associated
with the litigation. Since the burden of proof lies with the defendant, the
odds favor a plaintiff victory., 95 According to libel tourism experts, the
prevailing plaintiffs' ability to recover their fees in U.K. libel
proceedings, combined with plaintiff-friendly law, "accounts for much
of libel tourism and its chilling impact on U.S. speech.... [Tihe specter
87. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.) (Eng.).
88. Id. at 1007, 1013.
89. Id. at 1007-08. Circulation of Forbes in the United Kingdom was under 2000 magazines,
as compared to the near 800,000 in circulation within the United States at the time. Id. at 1008;
2 GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 11.04(E), at 11-129 (3d
ed. 2011). Delta and Matsuura, disagreeing with the British court's conclusion that international
businessman Berezovsky had a reputation to protect in the United Kingdom, argue:
The harm to the reputation of a Russian citizen occurs in Russia, if anywhere. It is
difficult to see what interest England could have in protecting the reputation of Russian
nationals. If the decision of the House of Lords is taken to its logical conclusion,
Berezovsky, as an international investor, has a reputation to protect in each country in
which he has investments. Thus, he should be able to sue Forbes in any such country as
long as at least one copy of the magazine is sold there.
2 DELTA & MATSUURA, supra, § 11.04(E), at 11-129.
90. [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.).
91. Id. at [14]-[15], [22]-[23].
92. See id. at [22]-[23].
93. Rendleman, supra note 10, at 479 & n.63.
94. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 49 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman,
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP); Rendleman, supra note 10, at 479 & n.69.
95. Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 43, at 259 (footnote omitted) (comparing the United
Kingdom's fee shifting provision to the "American rule").
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of fees topping over £1 million causes U.S. publishers to think twice
before publishing in the U.K. or writing about a U.K. resident. 9 6
3. Level of Review
The trial-level protections of libel defendants in the United States
are supported by the appellate courts' commitment to conducting a de
novo review to ensure that constitutional limitations on a particular libel
suit were properly applied. 97 Instead of conducting the typical appellate
review of jury verdicts, judges are required to examine the entire record
and ensure that "any judgment awarded to a plaintiff does not constitute
a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. ' ' 98 As a result, inthe
United States, upwards of seventy percent of libel judgments in the
plaintiff's favor are reversed on appeal. 99 The United Kingdom,
however, has no equivalent rule to review libel verdicts. 100
D. Chilling Effect: Suppressing the Disseminationof Information
Libel tourism effectively subjects every author and publisher
around the world to the laws of the most pro-plaintiff libel forum. 01 As a
result, authors across the globe are discouraged from reporting on
matters of public concern, for fear that any mistake made in their work
will trigger liability in a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction.0 2 This fear has
grown in the age of electronic communication. 10 3 Because books,
96. Balin et al., supra note 71, at 124 (discussing the incentives libel plaintiffs have in
bringing suit in U.K. courts).
97. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485, 492-93, 511 (1984) (granting certiorari to determine what standard of review applies to libel
appeals and holding that "Uludges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the
entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of 'actual malice").
99. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP); Daniel Huff, The Speech Act Should Not Pre-empt State Law,
NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=120246431373&
TheSpeech Act shouldnot-preemptstate-law&slretum=l.
100. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
101. BELL, supra note 33, at 3. This is also known as the so-called "race to the bottom'-that
is, the theory that libel tourists will pick the best, most plaintiff-friendly forum over any other
forum. See Are Foreign Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans' First Amendment Rights?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary] (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
102. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 23 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
103. Id. at 45-46 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine
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newspapers, journals, and other media are easily accessible on the
Internet in any country, authors and publishers can be subjected to the
libel laws of any forum abroad.' 4 American authors in particular have
censored themselves to ensure that their writing satisfies U.K. libel law,
because they are not protected overseas by First Amendment
standards. 0 5 Libel tourism therefore creates a "chilling effect" on free
speech and cuts off the flow of information to the public in areas such as
entertainment, business, politics, and national security news (among
others). 0 6 A few examples of libel tourism's chilling effect illustrate the
danger that libel tourism poses to investigative reporting and journalism.
1. Berezovsky v. Michaels: How a Russian Businessman and
Politician Used Libel Tourism to Intimidate Forbes
In 1997, a Russian businessman and politician named Boris
Berezovsky sued the editor and publisher of Forbes, a New York-based
publication, for libel in the United Kingdom. 10 7 The publication at issue
was an article titled "Godfather of the Kremlin?," written by RussianAmerican journalist Paul Klebnikov. 0 8 With the help of information
obtained by anonymous sources, Klebnikov's article exposed
Berezovsky's possible involvement in crime, including murder, to the
public. 0 9 Berezovsky's tactical move of suing Forbes in the United
Kingdom was crucial to his lawsuit's success. 10 Had Berezovsky, a
public official, pursued the libel action against Forbes in the United
States, he would have needed to prove that the Forbes article contained
substantially false information and that such information was published
with actual malice.' In contrast, in the United Kingdom, Berezovsky
needed to prove much less-the article's falsity and the defendant's

LLP).
104. Id. at45.
105. Id. at 23 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 20; id. at 51 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman, Partner, Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP). See also Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.) at 1008 (Eng.)
(describing the procedural history of the case). Berezovsky brought suit in the United Kingdom,
despite the fact that he and the second plaintiff lived in Russia and a very few number of Forbes
copies were distributed in the United Kingdom. Readers Say, Berezovsky vs. Forbes,FORBES, Mar.
31, 2003, at 22, 22.
108. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 20 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP). See Godfather of the Kremlin?, FORBES, Dec. 30, 1996, at 90.
109. BELL, supra note 33, at 16-17. See, e.g., Godfather of the Kremlin?, supra note 108, at 9192.
110. BELL, supra note 33, at 17.
111. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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culpability were already presumed.' 12 To rebut that presumption, Forbes
needed to establish that the statements made in its article were true.113
Rather than face that burden of proof-made even more
insurmountable in light of the article's anonymous sources-Forbes
settled the case six years after the suit was first brought in the High
Court of London. 1 4 Even though Forbes journalists had spent months
researching and investigating the Berezovsky story, 1 5 Forbes made a
formal retraction of the article in open court-after which Berezovsky
withdrew the suit. 116 In its retraction, the magazine claimed that there
was no evidence demonstrating Berezovsky's responsibility for any
murder, and that it was wrong to have characterized Berezovsky as a
mob boss. 1 7 Incidentally, Klebnikov, the author of the article, was
murdered in Moscow in 2004.118 With the threat of libel tourism,
American journalists like Klebnikov can no longer depend on the First
Amendment to protect their freedom of speech. Although it is unknown
whether Berezovsky was involved in Klebnikov's murder,119 Klebnikov
and Forbes's story demonstrates the extent to which libel tourism can
have a chilling effect on journalists' willingness to report on business or
political news.
2. Humayun Mirza: How Libel Tourism Destroyed a Man's Life's
Work
American author Humayun Mirza dedicated years of his life to
writing a 400-page biography of his father, Iskander Mirza, the first
President of Pakistan. 120 Shortly after the biography was published in
112. BELL, supranote 33, at 17 ("In England ... Berezovsky needed to prove nothing.... [H]e
could force [Forbes] to try to produce its anonymous Russian sources in an English court."). See
supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
113. See BELL, supra note 33, at 17.
114. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 20 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP) (describing the chilling effect of the Berezovsky case); Readers
Say, supranote 107, at 22.
115. BELL, supranote 33, at 16.
116. Readers Say, supra note 107, at 22.
117. Id.
118. Valeria Korchagina, Klebnikov Slaying Probed at Top Level, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 13, 2004, at 1.
119. See id. at 2. In a telephone interview conducted after Klebnikov's murder, Berezovsky
claimed that "[slomebody clearly did not like the way [Klebnikov] operated and decided to sort it
out with him, Russian-style, not through the English courts like I did." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 18 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP) (describing the chilling effect of the Humayun Mirza incident).
Mirza's book was titled From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskander Mirza. Id. The
book chronicles Mirza's lineage and more than 300 years of Indian and Pakistani history. Id.;
HUMAYUN MIRZA, FROM PLASSEY TO PAKISTAN: THE FAMILY HISTORY OF ISKANDER MIRZA, THE
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1999, however, Iskander's wife threatened to sue Humayun and his
publisher for libel in the United Kingdom. 21 Apparently, she had been
unhappy with the way Humayun depicted her in the book. 22 Since the
biography was well-researched, each statement supported by firsthand
observations, decades of conversations, and documents from the U.S.
Department of State, there is no doubt that the biography would have
been protected under the laws of the United States. 123 But due to her
leverage as a potential libel plaintiff in the United Kingdom, Iskander
Mirza's wife was able to intimidate Humayun into destroying the first
edition of the book he spent years writing.124 This account demonstrates
that libel tourism has the effect of chilling even the most wellinvestigated stories, preventing authors and publishers from presenting
them to the public.
3. Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld: How Libel Tourism Caused an
American Author to Suffer Financial, Reputational, and
Emotional Harm
To date, the most well-known libel tourism case is Bin Mahfouz v.
Ehrenfeld, which prompted a change in N.Y. State libel law 125 and,
FIRST PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN (rev. ed. 2002).

121. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
122. 2 DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 89, § 11.04(E), at 11-127.
123. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
124. See Brown Testifies on Libel Tourism Before Senate Judiciary Commnittee, BAKER &
HOSTETLER LLP (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.bakerlaw.com/brown-testifies-on-libel-tourism-beforesenate-judiciary-committee-03-03-2010/.
125. Before the British libel action concluded, Ehrenfeld sued Bin Mahfouz (the plaintiff in the
British suit) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Ehrenfeld v. Bin
Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2008). Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment that Bin
Mahfouz could not prevail on the British libel claim and that any default judgment rendered against
her in the United Kingdom would be invalid. Id. at 104. A year later, after a default judgment had
been entered against Ehrenfeld in the United Kingdom, Ehrenfeld sought a declaration that the
judgment in the British case was not enforceable in the United States based on First Amendment
protections. Id. The court granted Bin Mahfouz's dismissal motion for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified a question to the N.Y. Court of Appeals regarding the
extension of personal jurisdiction over Bin Mahfouz. Id. The court held that authority to extend
jurisdiction over libel tourists had to come from the N.Y. State legislature. Id. Based on that
decision, the Second Circuit refused to extend jurisdiction over Bin Mahfouz, but stated that if a
new bill extending jurisdiction over libel tourists were signed into law, Ehrenfeld could reopen her
case. Id. at 106. In response, the N.Y. State legislature amended its long-arm statute, conferring
jurisdiction to N.Y. courts over persons who have obtained a foreign defamation judgment against a
N.Y. resident. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2010). The legislature also amended its state law
on recognition of foreign judgments; now, a N.Y. court need not recognize a foreign defamation
judgment unless it determines that the law applied by the foreign court is at least as protective of
free speech as are the constitutions of the United States and New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(8)
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eventually, federal law. 126 The plaintiffs in the foreign defamation action
were Saudi businessman Khalid bin Mahfouz and his two sons. They
sued American author Rachel Ehrenfeld, as well as her publisher, for
libel in the United Kingdom. 127 The publication at issue was Ehrenfeld's
book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed-andHow to Stop It,
which alleged that Bin Mahfouz funded al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations. 28 When Ehrenfeld did not appear to defend herself in the
foreign action,
the U.K. court granted Bin Mahfouz a default
129
judgment.
Even though the suit was never decided on the merits, the default
judgment against Ehrenfeld had a lasting effect on her ability to
publish. 30 The Queen's Bench not only awarded damages and costs of
the proceedings against her and her publisher, but it also included in its
judgment a declaration of falsity against Ehrenfeld's book.' 31Moreover,
the judgment directed her to publish an apology to the plaintiffs and
included an injunction against further publication of Funding Evil. 13 2 In
effect, the suit caused Ehrenfeld emotional distress and prevented her
from traveling abroad. 133 Ehrenfeld has stated: "The psychological,
emotional and financial effects of the threat of this libel suit against me
in London will stay with me as long as I live."' 134 Ehrenfeld's case
demonstrates that the chilling effect on free speech caused by

(McKinney Supp. 2011). Illinois, California, Florida, and other states have also enacted anti-libel
tourism legislation. See generally Libel Tourism, MEDIA L. RES. CTR., http://www.medialaw.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Hot__Topics/LibelTourism/Libel_Tourism.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012)
(showing the status of current state anti-libel tourism bills).
126. See S. REP. No. 111-224, at 3 (2010) (discussing how the high-profile case exposed the
chilling effect of libel tourism, prompting the passage of the SPEECH Act).
127. Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156, [I], [6]-[7], [12]-[13] (Eng.).
128. Id. at [13], [16].
129. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American
Center for Democracy).
130. Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at 4-5 (statement of Kurt
A. Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP). Kurt A. Winmer, an expert witness before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated that a default judgment against Ehrenfeld "may impede
[her] from obtaining future publishing contracts because publishers carry insurance policies that
might make them shy away from an author that is already subject to a libel judgment." Id. at 5. See
Libel Tourism Hearing,supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American Center for
Democracy).
131. Bin Mahfouz, EWHC (QB) 1156 at [741-[75].
132. Hearing Before the S.Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at 4 (statement of Kurt A.
Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP).
133. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American
Center for Democracy) ("[Bin] Mahfouz also chilled my ability to travel to the U.K., lest I be
arrested to enforce the British judgment against me. I run the same risk in Europe and in most
Commonwealth states, due to their reciprocal enforcement of judgments.").
134. Id.at11.
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uncontrolled libel suits is not a mere abstraction, but a real threat that
requires a strong, effective response.
E. The SPEECHAct and Other FederalResponses
For years, Congress struggled to create legislation to effectively
address the issue of libel tourism and its chilling effect. It attempted 3to5
tackle the issue by introducing a weak bill during the 110th Congress;1
it also introduced two stronger responses, the Free Speech Protection
Acts of 2008136 and 2009,137 during the 110th and 111th Congresses.
The weak bill, introduced by U.S. Representative Steve Cohen of
Tennessee, 3 8 had the purpose of "protect[ing] the right to freedom of
speech under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States from the potentially weakening effects of foreign judgments
concerning defamation."' 139 Nevertheless, the bill merely barred courts
within the United States from recognizing or enforcing foreign
defamation judgments inconsistent with the First Amendment.14 0 It did
not provide U.S. authors or publishers the ability to sue for a declaration
that foreign libel judgments against them were unenforceable, and it
never touched upon the award of attorneys' fees. 141
The Free Speech Protection Act of 2008 did allow U.S. persons
defending libel actions abroad to seek declaratory, in addition to
injunctive, relief from the enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S.
domestic courts.142 The act also allowed U.S. persons to seek three types
of damages against libel tourist plaintiffs. First, the act provided that
U.S. persons could recover damages in the amount of the foreign
judgment, along with the costs they incurred while defending themselves

135. H.R. 6146, 110th Cong. (2008).
136. Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S. 2977, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 5814, 110th
Cong. (2008).
137. Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1304, 111 th Cong. (2009); S. 449, 111 th Cong.
(2009).
138. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at I (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
139. H.R. 6146 § I(b).
140. Id. § 2(a).
141. See id. §§ 1-2.
142. Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S.2977, 110th Cong. § 3(a), (c)(1) (2008);
H.R.5814, 110th Cong. § 3(a), (c)(1) (2008). See Howard Wasserman, More on the Free Speech
Protection Act, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21, 2008, 8:20 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs

blawg/2008/05/more-on-the-fre.html. A pertinent part of the act allowed any U.S. person against
whom a libel lawsuit was brought in a foreign country to bring an action in a U.S. district court
against the person who brought that foreign suit, provided that the writing or speech at issue did not
constitute defamation under the laws of the United States. S. 2977 § 3(a); H.R. 5814 § 3(a).
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in the foreign action. 143 Second, the act permitted U.S. persons to recover
damages for harms suffered as a result of adverse foreign libel
judgments, including lost opportunities to publish, conduct research, or
generate funding.' 44 Finally, the act provided for an award of treble
damages if a jury determined that the libel tourist-plaintiff pursued the
lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction in order to suppress a U.S. person's First
Amendment rights. 145 Additionally, the act extended U.S. jurisdiction
over anyone who sued a U.S. person for libel in a foreign country. 146 The
Free Speech Protection Act of 2009 was nearly identical to the act
introduced in 2008.147 Neither passed, however, as they were deemed too
forceful a response to the problem of libel tourism 48and would have
placed an extraordinary strain on international comity.1

Less than a year later, Congress successfully passed the SPEECH
Act. 149 According to its House Report, the Act's purpose is "to dissuade
potential defamation plaintiffs from circumventing First Amendment
protections by filing suit in foreign jurisdictions that lack similar
protections."' 150 Specifically, the Act purports to respond to libel tourism
and deter its continued use by doing the following: mandating nonrecognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments that do not
comport with the U.S. Constitution (with one exception); protecting
interactive computer service providers from foreign libel actions;
allowing authors and publishers to seek declaratory relief against foreign
libel judgments; and providing for the recovery of reasonable attorneys'
fees incurred in the United States for actions brought by foreignjudgment creditors to enforce their judgments."'
143. S.2977 § 3(c)(2)(A)-(B); H.R. 5814 § 3(c)(2)(A)-(B); Wasserman, supra note 142.
144. S.2977 § 3(c)(2)(C); H.R. 5814 § 3(c)(2)(C); Wasserman, supra note 142.
145. S.2977 § 3(d); H.R. 5814 § 3(d); Wasserman, supra note 142. The proposed Senate bill of
the Free Speech Protection Act of 2008 provided:
If ...the jury determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the person or entity
bringing the foreign lawsuit at issue intentionally engaged in a scheme to suppress rights
under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States by discouraging
publishers or other media not to publish, or discouraging employers, contractors, donors,
sponsors, or similar financial supporters not to employ, retain, or support, the research,
writing, or other speech of a journalist, academic, commentator, expert, or other
individual, the court may award treble damages.
S.2977 § 3(d). See also H.R. 5814 § 3(d) (providing treble damages if the finder of fact determines
that the foreign lawsuit was brought to suppress First Amendment rights).
146. S.2977 § 3(b); H.R. 5814 § 3(b).
147. Daniel C. Taylor, Note, Libel Tourism: Protecting Authors and Preserving Comity, 99
GEO. L.J. 189, 207 n.109 (2010).
148. See Rendleman, supra note 10, at 486-87; Wasserman, supra note 142.
149. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (Supp. IV 2011)).
150. H.R. REP. No. 111-154, at 1 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 812, 813.
151. See infra Part II.E.1-4.
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1. Non-Recognition and Non-Enforcement
The SPEECH Act is a response to the effect that foreign proplaintiff libel laws have had on American authors and publishers. 51 2 To
offset that effect, the SPEECH Act prohibits every domestic court in the
United States from recognizing or enforcing judgments of foreign
jurisdictions whose libel laws are not as protective of freedom of
expression as American law.' 53 However, even if the libel laws applied
in the foreign court's adjudication are not as protective, recognition and
enforcement are allowed if the party seeking enforcement proves that the
defendant in the foreign action would have been liable for defamation
under the U.S. Constitution and state law.' 54 Furthermore, the SPEECH
Act is a response to the United Kingdom's lenient requirements to
exercise jurisdiction. 55 The Act prohibits all domestic courts in the
United States from enforcing a foreign judgment if the foreign forum's
exercise of personal jurisdiction failed to comport with U.S. principles of
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 56 The party
seeking recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment bears the
burden of establishing that the foreign court's exercise157of personal
jurisdiction comported with U.S. due process requirements.
2. Protection of Interactive Computer Service Providers
The SPEECH Act is also a response to "the boom in Internet
publishing that wiped out traditional, 'real-world' jurisdictional lines
across the globe,"' 158 which has made authors and publishers vulnerable
to any forum with lax requirements for exercising personal
jurisdiction.159 The Act prohibits recognition or enforcement of a foreign
libel judgment against interactive computer service providers, unless
those providers would not have been protected under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996.160
152. According to the Act's Senate Report, the law's purpose is "to ensure that American
authors, reporters, and publishers have nationwide protection from foreign libel
judgments ....[The Act] combats the chilling effect that foreign defamation lawsuits are having on
"S. REP. No. 111-224, at 4 (2010).
American free speech ....
153. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A).
154. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B).
155.

See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 4.

156. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(b)(1).
157. Id. § 4102(b)(2).
158. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 20 (prepared statement of Bruce D. Brown,
Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1); see supra text accompanying notes 79-81. The burden of
establishing that the foreign judgment is consistent with the Communications Decency Act falls to
the party seeking recognition or enforcement of that judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(2).
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3. Declaratory Relief
Additionally, the Act gives U.S. persons sued abroad, and against
whom a foreign libel judgment is entered, the opportunity to bring an
action in federal court for a declaration that the foreign judgment against
,,
them is "repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. 16 1
The burden of establishing the unenforceability of the foreign libel
judgment falls upon the party that raises a cause of action under the
Act. 162 This declaratory relief affords American authors sued abroad for
libel the opportunity to clear their names and stanch the foreign action's
adverse effects, be it monetary or reputational, upon their work.163 Under
this section of the Act, process may be served in the judicial district
where the case is brought, or in any other U.S. district where the
64
defendant may be found, resides, has an agent, or transacts business.'
In effect, this authorizes nationwide service of process in actions for
declaratory relief from foreign libel judgments, and allows an assertion
to the greatest
of personal jurisdiction over foreign-judgment creditors
1 65
extent acceptable under U.S. due process principles.
4. Removal and Award of Attorneys' Fees
The SPEECH Act also creates broad ground for removing such
actions from state to federal court, without regard to amount-incontroversy requirements and while permitting minimal diversity
between the parties. 166 The SPEECH Act also allows U.S. persons to
collect reasonable attorneys' fees for actions that foreign-judgment
creditors bring in the United States to enforce their judgments, absent
exceptional circumstances. 167 This is in stark contrast to the Free Speech
Protection Acts of 2008 and 2009, which allowed U.S. persons to
recover damages in the amount of the foreign judgment, the costs and
fees incurred while defending themselves in the foreign action, damages
168
for harms suffered due to that foreign action, and treble damages.

161. 28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(l).
162. Id. § 4104(a)(2).
163. See Laura R. Handman et al., U.S. Congress Passes Historic Libel Tourism Bill, CORP.
FIN. L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2010), http:llwww.corpfinblog.com/2010/08/articles/federal-legislation/us-

congress-passes-historic-libel-tourism-bill.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 4104(b).
165. Handman et al., supra note 163.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 4103. See Handman et al., supra note 163.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 4105.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
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III.

SPEECH WITHOUT TEETH AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
69
Although many have celebrated the passage of the SPEECH Act,'
there have been indications that the Act does not go far enough to protect
against libel tourism. 170 Primarily, Congress declined the opportunity to
give the Act teeth to combat the root of libel tourism; instead, it opted to
enact legislation that goes somewhat beyond what the failed, weak
federal bill proposed in 2008, but which is not nearly as toothsome as the
failed, stronger Free Speech Protection Acts of 2008 and 2009."' The
result is a federal response that does little to discourage litigants from
72
pursuing libel actions in plaintiff-friendly forums in the first place.
While the SPEECH Act does prohibit U.S. courts from recognizing
and enforcing foreign libel judgments that do not comport with the First
Amendment,173 non-recognition and non-enforcement will not stop
litigants who simply want to use libel tourism to intimidate authors and
prevent them from exercising their First Amendment rights. 74 U.S.
Representative Peter King of New York, a proponent of punitive
measures to discourage filing of libel lawsuits abroad, has stated that
"it's not money [libel tourists] are after ....They want a settlement or
default judgment. They want the publicity, an apology, and they want
these books to disappear."'' 75 According to expert witness Kurt A.
Wimmer, who testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
If we know that U.S. courts will refuse to enforce a foreign judgment
that does not comply with the First Amendment, is there still a chill?
The answer, in my view, is yes. A foreign judgment, as soon as it is
rendered, has an immediate and damaging effect on the author who has
176
been sued, even if the judgment is never enforced in U.S. courts ....

169. See Reception to Celebrate the Passage of the SPEECH Act of 2010, HILL,
http://washingtonscene.thehill.conm/party-events-pictures/archive/6269-reception-to-celebrate-thepassage-of-the-speech-act-of-2010 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
170. See Fischer & Levy, supra note 26.
171. See Taylor, supra note 147, at 206-07 (stating that the SPEECH Act falls somewhere in
between a weak bill only providing for non-recognition and the stronger Free Speech Protection
Acts of 2008 and 2009).
172. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 8-9 (prepared statement of Rep. Peter King).
Representative King believed that the failed weak bill (H.R. 6146), similar to the SPEECH Act, did
not go far enough to combat the root of the libel tourism threat. See id.
173. See supra Part II.E.1.
174. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep. Peter King).
175. Id. at 8-9.
176. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at 4 (statement
of Kurt A. Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP).
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Additionally, the reality is that very few litigants seek to enforce foreign
libel judgments in the United States. 177 Those who have tried have met
unfavorable results. 178 It therefore appears as though there was little need
to fix this aspect of the libel tourism problem. 17 9
Instead, federal legislation should have addressed the financial
aspect of the problem, simultaneously discouraging libel tourists from
filing lawsuits abroad in the first place, while helping authors and
publishers seek damages for economic harms suffered due to libel
tourism. In its current form, however, the SPEECH Act only allows U.S.
persons to recover reasonable attorneys' fees when foreign-judgment
creditors seek to enforce their judgments within the United States. 180 The
Act awards neither damages to U.S. persons who may have been harmed
by foreign libel judgments inconsistent with the First Amendment, nor
attorneys' fees incurred by U.S. persons defending themselves in those
foreign actions.18
Rachel Ehrenfeld, whose story demonstrates the chilling effect of
libel tourism, has stated that "it would have been good had the SPEECH

177. According to Wimmer, enforcement in the United States of a foreign libel judgment is
merely an "occasional" issue. Id. at 16. "There have been only a few cases ...largely because a lot
of foreign libel plaintiffs really never intend to come to the United States to enforce." Id. Wimmer
has stated that libel tourists enjoy having a foreign judgment they choose not to enforce because the
judgment gives them an immediate sense of vindication without having to "deal with the First
Amendment." Id.
178. See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 251 (Md. 1997); Bachchan v. India
Abroad Publ'ns Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992). In both cases, a non-U.S. citizen who
obtained a libel judgment from the High Court of Justice in London sought to have the judgment
enforced in the United States. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232, 235; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62.
Both U.S. courts held that the foreign libel judgments were repugnant to state public policy, as the
judgments were imposed without regard to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Telnikoff,
702 A.2d at 236, 251; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662-64. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont has
stated that "[nio American court has ever enforced a foreign libel judgment." Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 8 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
179. See Paul Tweed, Editorial, So Much for the 'Special Relationship,' L. SoC'y GAZETTE,
July 23, 2009, at 10, 10, available at http://www.paultweed.com/doc/Law-Gazette-Article23.07.09.pdf (stating that in his thirty years of practice as a media lawyer, Tweed never once had to
seek enforcement of a U.K. libel judgment in an American court).
180. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, 28
U.S.C. § 4105 (Supp. IV 2011).
181. See id.
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Act provided for damages, too. ' 182 When commenting on the more
punitive Free Speech Protection Act, Ehrenfeld testified:
[Provisions allowing countersuits and damages] are essential to remove
the chilling effect of foreign libel suits, because they will serve as a
deterrent to people contemplating to sue American writers and
publishers in England or other foreign jurisdictions. Do you think [Bin]
Mahfouz would have sued me had he known I could countersue him
and ask for damages? And would not that
be true for others who sue
83
the Americans in London or elsewhere?1
Furthermore, many potential libel tourism victims possess assets
overseas. 184 These foreign assets are not shielded by the Act, and can be
collected to satisfy foreign libel judgments. 185 Moreover, a default
judgment in a foreign jurisdiction can still potentially restrict an author's
ability to travel and work abroad, and might hinder his or her ability to
deal with certain media and publishing outlets in the future.18 6 In
summary, the SPEECH Act does little to prevent the financial
consequences Americans face vis-A-vis their involvement in foreign libel
actions. Without broader measures permitting American authors and
publishers accused of libel in foreign jurisdictions to force their accusers
to pay for damages to their reputation or for legal fees incurred abroad,
87
Americans will continue to feel the chilling effect of libel tourism.
Congress also declined the opportunity to make the SPEECH Act
more protective of American authors and publishers after a foreign
judgment has been rendered against them. For example, the Act failed to
fully address what Bruce D. Brown, an expert witness testifying before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, identified as the problem of
"legal limbo."18 8 The issue can be described as follows: If the judgment
182. Sydney Smith, U.S. Libel Tourism Protection Act Signed into Law, British Activists See
Call for Reform, AM. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.acdemocracy.org/
viewarticle.cfm?category=Free%20Speech%20-%201n%20the%20Media&id=1054
(internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld, American
Center for Democracy).
184. See id. at 57 (prepared statement of Laura R. Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP) (noting that many large news organizations have assets overseas against which libel judgments
can be enforced).
185. S.REP. NO. 111-224, at 10 (2010); Huff, supra note 99.
186. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at5 (statement of Kurt A.
Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP).
187. See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 10 ("Congress needs to pass broader measures that permit
U.S. citizens accused of libel in foreign courts to force their accusers to pay for legal fees incurred
abroad and, in certain cases, additional damages.").
188. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 7 (statement of Bruce
D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:235

creditor does not move to enforce the foreign judgment in the United
States, a judgment debtor who does not have the means to bring an
action for declaratory relief will be left in legal limbo-a perpetual state
of uncertainty as to whether the judgment creditor will ever try to
enforce the judgment.1 89 To fix this issue, Congress could have set a
limitations period whereby judgment creditors would not be able to
enforce their libel judgments in the United States after a certain period of
time."9
Although a stronger SPEECH Act could have discouraged the filing
of libel suits abroad and been more protective of American authors and
publishers, the enactment of such a federal response to libel tourism
would have put a serious strain on international principles of
reciprocity.' 9' Generally speaking, the danger the world faces if U.S.
courts apply American principles of libel law when deciding whether to92
enforce foreign judgments is the notion of "libel tourism in reverse."1
That is, federal legislation in the United States that goes beyond making
non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign libel judgments
mandatory can have the effect of imposing the views and values of the
United States on the rest of the world. 193 Although the protections
provided under the SPEECH Act do not smack of American legal
imperialism, the Act-as it is in its current form-may
have its share of
194
negative repercussions on international comity.
One reason why the SPEECH Act may prove to be problematic is
that many countries, like the United Kingdom, adopt a reciprocity-based
approach to recognition of foreign judgments.'95 For example, according
to the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 196 the United
Kingdom will generally decline to recognize U.S. judgments if courts in
the United States do not recognize similar U.K. judgments. 97 Therefore,

189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Taylor, supra note 147, at 219-20.
192. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 68 (prepared statement of Linda J.Silberman,
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Id.
194. See EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41417, THE SPEECH ACT- THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO "LIBEL TOURISM" 13-14 (2010). "Comity," as defined by the well-known

1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot, is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens." 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
195. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41417, at 13.
196. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 13 (Eng.)
(explaining the United Kingdom's reciprocity-based approach to enforcing foreign judgments).
197. Id. § 9.
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a decision by a U.S. court not to enforce a libel judgment rendered in the
United Kingdom could affect the United Kingdom's willingness to
enforce libel judgments rendered in the United States. 198 Furthermore, a
decision by a U.S. court not to enforce a foreign libel judgment could
negatively affect a foreign country's willingness to enforce judgments
based on plaintiff-friendly U.S. laws. 199 For instance, U.S. antitrust law
is a very pro-plaintiff area of civil tort liability.200 Due to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law,20 ' many countries have
passed legislation impeding the discovery of useful evidence in antitrust
cases. 20 2 Legislation in the United Kingdom, in particular, has provided
2 3
1
that U.S. antitrust judgments will not be enforceable in U.K. courts.
Foreign countries may employ similar types of retaliatory tactics in the
aftermath of the SPEECH Act,2°
In summary, the SPEECH Act does not stop the prosecution or
enforcement of libel suits abroad. 20 5 The Act does little to make the
practice of libel tourism less appealing to those who wish simply to
206
dissuade future publication about them and to intimidate authors. 2 6 The
Act does not provide protection to authors and publishers who have
suffered financial and reputational harm due to the filing of libel lawsuits
overseas. 20 7 Federal legislation could have been more protective had it
addressed the "legal limbo" problem, 20 8 but the Act failed to do so. Yet
even with all these deficiencies, the SPEECH Act may still negatively
affect the United States's relationship with multiple forums around the
globe.20 9

198. See id.
199. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41417, at 13 (claiming that plaintiff-friendly U.S. laws may
become vulnerable due to the SPEECH Act).
200.

Id.

201. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1126, 1139
(D.D.C. 1983), affid sub nom. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
202. William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 363, 363 & n.1 (2001).

203. Id. at 363.
204. Taylor, supra note 147, at 219-20.
205. See Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep. Peter King).
206. See id.
207. See HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at 5 (statement of Kurt
A. Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP).
See id. at 7 (statement of Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
209. EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41417, THE SPEECH ACT: THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE TO "LIBEL TOURISM" 14 (2010).
208.
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IV. TWO SOLUTIONS WITH MORE BITE
Two routes can and should be taken to address the issue of libel
tourism and finally end its chilling effect. First, Congress should modify
the SPEECH Act to give it sharper teeth; this will reduce the practice of
libel tourism until the United States can pursue a global solution to the
problem. Second, the United States can take steps to form agreements
with the United Kingdom and other countries where libel tourism is a
common practice, harmonizing international jurisdiction law over
defamation cases.
A.

FurtherCurbing of the Practice

To further curb the practice of libel tourism, Congress should work
toward fixing the defects of the SPEECH Act while bearing in mind the
consequences a modification in statutory law could have on international
relations. As a preliminary matter, if it were to amend the Act in any
way, Congress should take care that modifications do not result in a
change of normal due process rules. 2 '0 Therefore, for proposed
modifications to have any effect, federal legislation should reflect the
requirement that individuals practicing libel tourism have minimum
contacts, and be amenable to suit, in the United States.2 "
As already discussed, the threat of a default judgment and fee
awards in the United Kingdom is the primary reason why libel tourism
continues to have such a chilling effect.2 12 For that reason, Congress
should attempt to add teeth to the SPEECH Act by giving discretion to
U.S. courts to award American authors and publishers the following:
first, reasonable attorneys' fees when seeking a declaration that a foreign
libel judgment is unenforceable; 21 3 and second, legal fees and other costs
incurred in defending themselves in a foreign libel suit.2 14 As to the latter
modification, such an award of legal fees and costs should occur after a
foreign-judgment creditor tries to enforce the judgment in the United
States and upon a finding by a U.S. court that the judgment cannot be
210. See Rivkin & Brown, supra note 28, at All (arguing that a federal legislative response to
libel tourism should be consistent with due process).
211. See id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 175-76, 180-86.
213. Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 7 (statement of Bruce
D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP). Currently, the SPEECH Act only allows U.S. persons
to collect reasonable attorneys' fees for actions that creditors of foreign libel judgments bring in the
United States to enforce those judgments. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4105 (Supp. IV 2011). Under the SPEECH Act, U.S.
persons cannot collect these fees when they seek declaratory relief. See id. §§ 4101-4105.
214. Balinetal., supra note 71, at 124.
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enforced or recognized. 215 According to libel tourism experts, "[s]uch
full fee awards in appropriate cases would help make publishers and
authors whole and would... provide more meaningful deterrence to
international forum shopping." 216 By providing for an award of fees and
costs incurred by U.S. authors and publishers in libel suits abroad, as
well as reasonable attorneys' fees in declaratory relief and domestic
enforcement proceedings, libel tourists will be dissuaded further 217 and
some of the financial repercussions of libel tourism to U.S.-based
authors and publishers will be allayed.218
Furthermore, Congress could add teeth to the SPEECH Act by
including a federal statute of limitations period for enforcement of
foreign libel judgments.219 Congress could provide that the statute of
limitations period for libel judgment enforcement be equal to the
limitations period set forth for defamation by the foreign jurisdiction in
which the suit was filed. 220 This would eliminate the "legal limbo"
problem faced by U.S. persons against whom foreign libel judgments are
means to bring an action in
rendered, but who do not have the financial
22
'
the United States for declaratory relief.

The SPEECH Act can also be amended to include the award of
damages for economic and reputational harm suffered because of libel
tourism, as well as treble damages as a means to penalize libel
tourists. 222 Although these amendments can be effective ways to deter
libel forum shopping and protect U.S. authors and publishers, Congress
has previously viewed such measures as unwise and disregarding
repercussions on international comity-therefore, they are unlikely to be
passed any time soon.223 But they are not the only solution to the
deficiencies of the SPEECH Act. Instead, Congress could focus
primarily on smaller changes to the Act that would give U.S. courts the
authority to award costs incurred abroad and during declaratory relief
proceedings, and that would address the "legal limbo" issue. Although
nothing short of a transnational response can effectively solve the

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See Hearing Before the S. Conmm. on the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 7 (statement of
Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(2), (d)
(2009); S. 449, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(2), (d) (2009); Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S. 2977,
110th Cong. § 3(c)(2), (d) (2008); H.R. 5814, 110th Cong. § 3(c)(2), (d) (2008).
223. See Taylor, supranote 147, at 219-21; Wasserman, supra note 142.
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problems libel tourism poses, such federal changes will help curb the
practice until the United States pursues an international solution.22 4
B. Eliminating the Practice
Risks of offending international comity limit the ability of Congress
to enact an aggressive federal statute to combat libel tourism. 22' For that
reason, modification of the SPEECH Act will likely fall short of ending
libel tourism and terminating its chilling effect once and for all.226 Libel
tourism is a global issue and should be combated through a transnational
solution.227 As already discussed, many non-U.S. courts have lax
jurisdiction requirements and are willing to exercise control over authors
whose works have had even the slightest exposure within their
jurisdictions.22 8 Potential libel tourism forums can include countries like
New Zealand and Singapore, and even such unexpected places as
Kyrgyzstan. 229 The Internet further exacerbates the global problem, as it
blurs jurisdictional lines and allows information to travel worldwide in a
matter of seconds.23 °
Only an international resolution can completely and effectively
address and eliminate the issue of libel tourism.23 1 Many libel tourism
experts have expressed this same sentiment. For example, Kurt A.
Wimmer, a witness testifying before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, has written: "Will legislation within the United States solve
[the libel tourism] problem entirely? To be sure, it would only be a
step. ' 232 Bruce D. Brown, another witness before the Committee, has
claimed that "[s]hort of having international treaties ... we may not be
able to eliminate [the threat of libel tourism] entirely., 233 Furthermore, a
transnational solution would likely assuage concerns about international

224. See infra Part IV.B.
225. See 156 CONG. REC. S5980 (daily ed. July 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
226. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 6 (statement of
Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
227. See BELL, supra note 33, at 3 (describing libel tourism as an issue that affects authors
around the globe).
228. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
229. See Balin et al., supranote 71, at 99 n.4.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 158-59.
231. Libel Tourism Hearing, supra note 15, at 71 (prepared statement of Linda J. Silberman,
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) (arguing that "only an international
solution can ultimately address an issue that has become as global as the Internet itself").
232. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 101, at 130 (prepared statement
of Kurt A. Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP).
233. Id. at 6 (statement of Bruce D, Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP).
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comity, since any agreement reached would necessarily be the result of
234
international compromise and cooperation.
Although an international treaty to establish common provisions on
mutual recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions has failed in
the past,235 there is no reason why the United States should proceed on
the assumption that creating an agreement to resolve the libel tourism
problem is unachievable or improbable. On the contrary, the executive
branch should vigorously pursue the possibility of drafting an
international agreement that addresses libel tourism. 236 There are a
number of possible ways an agreement can address the problem. First, an
international agreement can set forth some modicum of harmonization
between the countries' libel laws .2377 Second, an agreement can set forth a
uniform choice of law rule.238 Third, an agreement can harmonize
jurisdiction law over defamation cases.

239

An international agreement that would harmonize the defamation
laws of the United States and foreign countries such as the United
Kingdom would likely eliminate the problem of libel tourism-libel
suits filed in the United States and abroad would necessarily be governed
by the same laws. However, differences in cultural values and practices
make it unwise or improbable to create such an agreement. 240 Not only
do views of the meaning of "freedom of expression" vary significantly
from country to country (and in the communities found within those
countries), 24' but the notions of free speech and protection of reputation
also differ considerably in importance.242 In short, what is considered
libelous in one country may not be libelous in another. 243 Even if
international parties were to come up with a collective rule for
defamation, such a rule necessarily would be complex, thus leading to a
reduction of predictability in the law and the possibility that different

234. Taylor, supra note 147, at 225.
235. See id. (discussing the failure of the Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters).
236. See, e.g., Heather Maly, Note, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don't Publish at All: Forum
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the FirstAmendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL'Y

883, 931-32 (2006) (proposing an international agreement to address libel tourism).
237. Martin George, Hartley on the Problem of "'LibelTourism," CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (July
19, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/hartley-on-the-problem-of-libel-tourism.
238. Id.
239. Id. See Maly, supra note 236, at 931.
240. See George, supra note 237.
241. Kurt Wimmer, Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of Expression, 603 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 202,203 (2006).

242. George, supra note 237.
243. Banerjee, supra note 32.
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jurisdictions would interpret the law dissimilarly. 244 Therefore, while
countries that draft an international agreement could certainly entertain
the idea of harmonizing defamation law, such a solution would be
unworkable.245
Alternatively, an international agreement could create a uniform
choice of law rule with regard to libel suits. 246 That is, an agreement
could identify which country's law should apply when litigation involves
multiple jurisdictions.2 47 However, a uniform choice of law rule would
face similar issues as an international agreement that tries to harmonize
substantive law. Although a uniform choice of law rule would ensure
that the same substantive laws are applied to certain defamation cases,
jurisdictions applying these laws could interpret them differently, based
on their countries' values.24 8 Moreover, it would be difficult to settle on
a suitable rule. 249 An international agreement could apply the law of the
place in which the defamatory work was published; the place where
harm to the plaintiff's reputation occurred; the jurisdiction in which the
plaintiff lives; or the jurisdiction in which the defendant lives-all
applications that raise major issues and concerns. 250 An agreement that
creates a uniform choice of law rule would therefore be unfeasible.
The most effective avenue for solving the libel tourism problem is
to create an international agreement that harmonizes the jurisdiction law
used for defamation cases. If countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom could agree upon a forum that has the authority to
adjudicate libel cases, the number of forum choices available to a libel
tourist would be limited and would not necessarily comprise the most
plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction.2 5' If possible, an international agreement
should limit the libel plaintiff to filing his or her suit in the jurisdiction in
which the defendant is domiciled or resides, or the jurisdiction where the
plaintiff's reputation suffered actual harm.252
Alternatively, the agreement could limit the number of forums in
which potential litigants can pursue a defamation action for a particular

244. Id.
245. See id.
246. George, supra note 237.
247. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "choice of law" as "[tihe
question of which jurisdiction's law should apply in a given case").
248. George, supra note 237.
249. Id.
250. See id. For example, "[i]t is difficult to define where the harm occurs (especially in the
case of the Internet), and it might not be obvious where the damage is felt." Id.
251. See Banejee, supra note 32.
252. See id.
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publication. 3 It could also limit recovery of damages to actual
reputational harm suffered in the particular jurisdiction where the action
is brought. 4 Whichever route the harmonization of jurisdiction law
takes, one thing should be made clear: A court's control over a libel
defendant, exercised on the mere basis that the forum is the place of
publication of the allegedly defamatory work, should be insufficient for
personal jurisdiction purposes. 255 Such a limitation is necessary because,
with the advent of the Intemet, publication of defamatory work can
256
An agreement adopting such a
occur anywhere around the globe.
limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction over defamation cases would
allow these cases to be tried in countries where they would be tried
fairly, and would curtail the exploitation of pro-plaintiff forums by libel
tourists.

257

V.

CONCLUSION

Libel tourism severely threatens the nation's fundamental
commitment to an open marketplace of ideas. 8 Authors and publishers
have been forced to engage in self-censorship for fear that any error
made in their work will serve as bait for litigants to exploit foreign
jurisdictions with plaintiff-friendly libel laws. 9 Victims have suffered
financially and professionally, and they have experienced the chilling
effect that libel tourism has had on their ability to publish in the
future.26 °
The SPEECH Act is a good first step toward combating libel
tourism, but the Act will not solve a number of problems that the
practice poses.26' In particular, the Act does little to make the practice
less appealing to those who file libel lawsuits overseas simply to
dissuade future publication about them and to intimidate authors.262
Because risks of offending international comity limit Congress's ability
to enact an aggressive statute capable of eliminating the threat of libel
tourism, Congress should focus primarily on smaller changes to the
253. Maly, supra note 236, at 931.
254. Id. See Jonathan Frieden, Calder "Effects Test" Applied to Internet Defamation Case, ECOM. L. (Dec. 3, 2007, 10:40 AM), http:llecommercelaw.typepad.com/ecommercelawl2007/12/
calder-effects.html#tp.
255. See Banerjee, supra note 32.
256. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
257. Banerjee, supra note 32.
258. See supra Part II.D.
259. See supra text accompanying note 105.
260. See supra Part lI.D.
261. See supra Part III.
262. See supra Part III.
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SPEECH Act.263 Allowing, for example, libel tourism victims to recover
legal fees and costs they incur in defending themselves in defamation
suits abroad could curtail the practice until the United States pursues a
transnational solution.
Only a transnational solution can fully address libel tourism, "an
issue that has become as global as the Internet itself.' ' 264 The executive
branch should pursue efforts to draft an international agreement that
would harmonize laws relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in
defamation cases.265 No matter what form such an agreement takes, the
agreement should explicitly restrict courts from exercising jurisdiction
over libel defendants on the mere basis that the defamatory material at
issue was published in the forum before which the libel suit is brought.26 6
Because publication of defamatory material can occur in any forum
around the world via the Internet, this restriction is crucial to limit libel
tourists' exploitation of forums with pro-plaintiff libel laws. 267 If such
further steps are not taken, it is likely that journalism and scholarship in
the United States and around the world will continue to suffer the chill of
libel tourism.
Elizabeth J.Elias*

263. See supra Part IV.A.
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